Raven

To clarify, I was commenting on the initial DHS Site Specific Risk Assessment (SSRA) as an “inside job.” The National Research Council Committee was not, though some had fears that it would be given the presence of Dr. Ronald Atlas as the chair. As you may recall, Dr. Atlas sat on the Homeland Security Science & Technology Advisory Committee (HSSTAC) from 2004-06 and again from 2007-09. It was during his tenure on HSSTAC that the NBAF plan was hatched and the site selection/state treasury shakedown process was conducted.

The comparison between NBAF and CDC is misplaced. The NBAF champions still tout this false comparison despite the fact that it was debunked in the GAO’s 2008 and 2009 studies and yet again by the recent NAS report. Rod Trewyn and Tom Thornton should be ashamed of themselves for regurgitating such thoroughly debunked talking points.

Where do I begin? For starters, the continued (and tiresome) comparison of NBAF with CDC is inappropriate. Animal research at CDC is performed within safety cabinets/gloveboxes and is done on small animals. There are no “gloveboxes” for cows, sheep and swine. The animal room itself is the “glovebox” and people have to work/walk/kneel inside of it. The volume of waste produced by, say, mice and rhesus monkeys is incomparible to a cow – let alone a room containing 25-50 of them for an FMD vaccine challenge. Given this reality, there is a chance for mechanical transmission of the pathogen. The NAS report nicely covers the increased risk of aerosolization that can take place during routine cleaning.

Woking with 25+ cows in a room is very different than working with primates in a glovebox. Different species produce differing amount of virus – even when they have the same disease. Some species serve as amplifiers. A good example is the case of swine who are infected with Foot-and-Mouth disease. Pigs produce a tremendous amount of virus in their respiratory tract – as much as ONE MILLION virus particles per liter of exhaled air. Cattle are very susceptible to airborne transmission given the large tidal volume (big lungs) when they breathe.

Unlike at places like CDC, personnel working with dozens of cows exposed to FMD can be carriers of the disease. Why? Because they actually are in the “glovebox” (aka. room) with millions of virus particles. Mechanical transmission is a real concern. Mechanical Transmission of live FMD. Reference: Foreign Animal Diseases: 7th edition published by the US Animal Health Assn. in 2008. Page 264: “the potential for humans to harbor the FMDV in their respiratory tract has been investigated. It was noted that FMDV can be carried for a short period in the throats of people. Sampling of human subjects who had been in isolation rooms containing FMDV-infected animals demonstrated that the virus could be recovered from the nose, throat and saliva of 7-8 people up to 24 hours after immediately exiting the room.” In the history of accidental releases of FMD from bio-containment facilities, the overwhelming majority have ocurred due to human error.

The risk of Mechanical transmission of FMD is why Plum Island employees must comply with a personally recognizant quarantine for five days – every time they step foot into the lab. This means they must avoid susceptible species. This is relatively easy to do in Suffolk County, NY or Southeastern CT. Do you really expect every employee at NBAF to do the seem, even poorly paid cleaning contractors? How many will be tempted to visit Grandma on the ranch 2 or 3 days after being in the lab? As Rep. John Dingell said, this is a “foolish tempting of fate” that is contradicted by the reality that people are, well, human.

Most interesting is the fact that DHS itself concluded that there is a 70% probablity of the FMD virus escaping the NBAF within its projected 50 year life cycle. This is remarkable and should give everyone pause.

Finally, the NBAF champions love to cite the BSL-4 animal labs in Australia and Canada as justification for bringing NBAF to Kansas. There are, however, a few problems with this comparison: 1) Australia does not allow FMD research to be conducted in its lab; and 2) Canada only conducts FMD research at the BSL-4 level and has only one BSL-4 equipped room that can hold 2 cattle. NBAF will not conduct FMD reaserch at the BSL-4 level, it will conduct the reaserch at BSL-3Ag. Furthermore, NBAF will have dozens of FMD-exposed animals in its facility.

The NBAF champions march on in the face of damning counterarguments. Their talking points are repeatedly debunked, yet they still repeat them.

Enough!