CDC mating H5N1 and a strain of human flu

Study shows hybrids of bird flu and human flu viruses fit well, could occur

Source: The Canadian Press

An experiment mating H5N1 avian flu viruses and a strain of human flu in a laboratory produced a surprising number of hybrid viruses that were biologically fit, a new study reveals.

And while none of the offspring viruses was as virulent as the original H5N1, about one in five were lethal to mice at low doses, showing they retained at least a portion of the power of their dangerous parent.

The work suggests that under the right circumstances - and no one is clear what all of those are - the two types of flu viruses could swap genes in a way that might allow the H5N1 virus to acquire the capacity to trigger a pandemic. That process is called reassortment.

“This study is just showing exactly that: There is a risk this virus can successfully reassort with a human virus,” said Richard Webby, director of the World Health Organization’s collaborating centre for influenza research at St. Jude Hospital in Memphis, Tenn.

“The problem is we don’t know at this stage whether there’s a benefit to these H5N1 viruses in doing that.”

Nor can anyone say why, if the viruses swapped genes so readily in the laboratory, that hasn’t seemed to have happened in the parts of the world where H5N1 has been circulating for years.

“This is the million dollar question,” says senior author Dr. Ruben Donis, of the U.S. Centers for Disease Control’s influenza division.

Reassortment is one of two ways in which a pandemic virus can evolve. The other is for a bird virus to acquire a number of mutations that allow it to more easily infect people and transmit among them.

The latter, called adaptive mutation, is thought to be the way the 1918 Spanish flu virus emerged. The viruses responsible for the milder pandemics of 1957 and 1968 arose through the mixing of human and avian flu virus genes.

This work, done at the CDC, was conducted to study the reassortment potential of H5N1 and H3N2 viruses. H3N2 is one of two human influenza A viruses that cause disease during flu season.

The study was published in PLoS Pathogens, one of the Public Library of Science journals.

Reassortment studies can be done one of two ways. One involves simultaneously infecting cells with the two viruses and seeing what nature produces. The other involves making viruses by piecing together combinations of synthesized human and avian genes.

“It’s like Lego,” Donis, head of the molecular virology and vaccines branch, says of this approach, which was the one used for this study.

But this is a game of Lego where it’s not clear from looking at the pieces which will go together into a structure that will hold. “We really don’t understand the rules of engagement for playing the Legos. We don’t know what makes these things connect well or not connect well,” he admits.

The researchers created 63 viruses representing the various potential combinations of human and avian internal genes, using an H5N1 virus that circulated in Thailand in 2004 and an H3N2 virus recovered in Wyoming in 2003.

All but one of the hybrids carried the hemagglutinin and neuraminidase genes - the H and N in a flu virus’s name of H5N1. The remaining one used the neuraminidase from the human virus, creating an H5N2 virus that grew virtually as well as the H5N1 virus and was almost as lethal in mice.

Once the viruses were made they were placed in a medium to see if and how well they grew. Viruses were then harvested to use to infect mice, to test for virulence.

While 13 of the hybrid viruses either didn’t grow or barely grew, the other 50 grew to some degree. And 28 replicated nearly as well as the original H5N1. Donis admits he was surprised by how well the avian and human gene combinations performed.

“I was expecting more incompatibility,” he says.

By studying the combinations that succeeded and failed, the scientists were able to start to see patterns of which gene combinations are critical for an H5N1 virus to thrive.

When the most viable viruses were tested in mice, none was as nasty as H5N1. “That’s the good news,” Donis says, alluding to the fact that if reassortment turns H5N1 into a pandemic strain, the resulting virus could be less virulent than the current version.

Since late 2003 there have been 383 confirmed human cases of H5N1 infection and 241, or 63 per cent, of those people have died.

The virus that most closely matched H5N1 for virulence was one with three avian genes, the hemagglutinin and neuraminidase, plus the PB1 gene combined with five genes from the human virus.

Both the viruses from the 1957 and 1968 pandemics carried an avian PB1 gene. The authors suggest that picking up an avian PB1 gene may be a critical step in a potential pandemic virus arising through reassortment.

But just because the viruses mated successfully in a laboratory doesn’t mean those viruses could go on to trigger a pandemic. In order to have that potential, a virus would have to be able to transmit from person to person - a skill that has so far eluded H5N1.

“The bottom line is it comes back down to transmission really being the key,” Webby says. “But to say that we understand what are the factors involved in transmission is certainly an overstatement.”

Earlier work at the CDC on some H5N1-H3N2 reassortant viruses showed they failed to transmit from infected to uninfected ferrets, an animal often used in flu research.

Donis says his team hopes to test its reassortant viruses in ferrets as well, but is still going through the approvals process.

One Response to “CDC mating H5N1 and a strain of human flu”

  1. Spread of avian flu by drinking water:

    Proved awareness to ecology and transmission is necessary to understand the spread of avian flu. For this it is insufficient exclusive to test samples from wild birds, poultry and humans for avian flu viruses. Samples from the known abiotic vehicles also have to be analysed. There are plain links between the cold, rainy seasons as well as floods and the spread of avian flu. That is just why abiotic vehicles have to be analysed. The direct biotic transmission from birds, poultry or humans to humans can not depend on the cold, rainy seasons or floods. Water is a very efficient abiotic vehicle for the spread of viruses - in particular of fecal as well as by mouth, nose and eyes excreted viruses.

    Infected birds and poultry can everywhere contaminate the drinking water. All humans have very intensive contact to drinking water. Spread of avian flu by drinking water can explain small clusters in households too. Proving viruses in water is difficult because of dilution. If you find no viruses you can not be sure that there are not any. On the other hand in water viruses remain viable for a long time. Water has to be tested for influenza viruses by cell culture and in particular by the more sensitive molecular biology method PCR.

    There is a widespread link between avian flu and water, e.g. in Egypt to the Nile delta or Indonesia to residential districts of less prosperous humans with backyard flocks and without central water supply as in Vietnam: http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol12no12/06-0829.htm. See also the WHO web side: http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/emerging/h5n1background.pdf .

    Transmission of avian flu by direct contact to infected poultry is an unproved assumption from the WHO. There is no evidence that influenza primarily is transmitted by saliva droplets: “Transmission of influenza A in human beings” http://www.thelancet.com/journals/laninf/article/PIIS1473309907700294/abstract?iseop=true .

    Avian flu infections may increase in consequence to increase of virus circulation. In hot climates/the tropics flood-related influenza is typical after extreme weather and floods. Virulence of influenza viruses depends on temperature and time. Special in cases of local water supplies with “young” and fresh H5N1 contaminated water from low local wells, cisterns, tanks, rain barrels, ponds, rivers or rice paddies this pathway can explain small clusters in households. At 24°C e.g. in the tropics the virulence of influenza viruses in water amount to 2 days. In temperate climates for “older” water from central water supplies cold water is decisive to virulence of viruses. At 7°C the virulence of influenza viruses in water amount to 14 days.

    Human to human and contact transmission of influenza occur - but are overvalued immense. In the course of influenza epidemics in Germany, recognized clusters are rare, accounting for just 9 percent of cases e.g. in the 2005 season. In temperate climates the lethal H5N1 virus will be transferred to humans via cold drinking water, as with the birds in February and March 2006, strong seasonal at the time when drinking water has its temperature minimum.

    The performance to eliminate viruses from the drinking water processing plants regularly does not meet the requirements of the WHO and the USA/USEPA. Conventional disinfection procedures are poor, because microorganisms in the water are not in suspension, but embedded in particles. Even ground water used for drinking water is not free from viruses.

    http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=26096&Cr=&Cr1
    Ducks and rice [paddies = flooded by water] major factors in bird flu outbreaks, says UN agency
    Ducks and rice fields may be a critical factor in spreading H5N1
    26 March 2008 – Ducks, rice [fields, paddies = flooded by water! Farmers on work drink the water from rice paddies!] and people – and not chickens – have emerged as the most significant factors in the spread of avian influenza in Thailand and Viet Nam, according to a study carried out by a group of experts from the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and associated research centres.

    “Mapping H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza risk in Southeast Asia: ducks, rice and people” also finds that these factors are probably behind persistent outbreaks in other countries such as Cambodia and Laos.
    The study, which examined a series of waves of H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza in Thailand and Viet Nam between early 2004 and late 2005, was initiated and coordinated by FAO senior veterinary officer Jan Slingenbergh and just published in the latest issue of the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States.
    Through the use of satellite mapping, researchers looked at a number of different factors, including the numbers of ducks, geese and chickens, human population size, rice cultivation and geography, and found a strong link between duck grazing patterns and rice cropping intensity.

    In Thailand, for example, the proportion of young ducks in flocks was found to peak in September-October; these rapidly growing young ducks can therefore benefit from the peak of the rice harvest in November-December [at the beginning of the cold: Thailand, Viet Nam, Cambodia, Laos are situated – different from Indonesia – in the northern hemisphere].

    “These peaks in congregation of ducks indicate periods in which there is an increase in the chances for virus release and exposure, and rice paddies often become a temporary habitat for wild bird species,” the agency said in a news release.

    “We now know much better where and when to expect H5N1 flare-ups, and this helps to target prevention and control,” said Mr. Slingenbergh. “In addition, with virus persistence becoming increasingly confined to areas with intensive rice-duck agriculture in eastern and south-eastern Asia, evolution of the H5N1 virus may become easier to predict.”

    He said the findings can help better target control efforts and replace indiscriminate mass vaccination.
    FAO estimates that approximately 90 per cent of the world’s more than 1 billion domestic ducks are in Asia, with about 75 per cent of that in China and Viet Nam. Thailand has about 11 million ducks.

    Dipl.-Ing. Wilfried Soddemann - Epidemiologist - Free Science Journalist soddemann-aachen@t-online.de

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